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Abstract: Recent literature suggests that organizational entities, such as states
and business corporations, can qualify as moral agents. Does it follow that, as
members of our moral community, group agents are entitled to moral protec-
tions? This article explores the connection between groups’ moral agency and
moral rights. I argue that corporate moral agency does not, in itself, ground a
group’s claim for moral protections. Nevertheless, a group agent can be entitled
to derivative moral rights protections, which attach to the group itself but are
grounded in the interests of individuals, such as the group’s members.
Furthermore, the agential status of a group helps to identify which rights can
attach to it, given its moral agency. One such moral agency related right is a
right not to be morally subverted. This right generates a duty for the group
agent’s members to ensure that its decision-making process incorporates sound
moral reasoning. The final part of the article applies these conclusions to recent
debates on the rights of states. I argue that, as moral agents, states have a moral
right not to be morally subverted. It follows that citizens have a pro tanto duty,
directed at their state, not to engage in political activities that would subvert its
moral powers.
Keywords: corporate moral agency, corporate responsibility, group rights, state
rights, civic duties
Introduction
In recent years there is a growing consensus amongst philosophers and poli-
tical theorists around the “corporate moral agency thesis.” This thesis suggests
that groups with an organizational structure can qualify as moral agents in
and on themselves, if they have an internal decision-making process that
allows them to grasp moral reasons and to generate consistent beliefs, desires
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and goals; and if they have authority and command mechanisms that enable
them to execute their goals.1
As many defenders of the corporate moral agency thesis argue, if a group is
a moral agent, it is responsible for its actions and omissions. Corporate moral
agents (CMAs), such as, business corporations and states, can be morally
responsible for what they do (in the sense of being blameworthy or praiseworthy
for their behaviour), over and above the individual responsibility of their mem-
bers. They can also be subjected to an appropriate set of responses, such as
censure and punishment, in light of their behaviour. CMAs may also be assigned
with forward-looking responsibilities, for example, duties of rescue, or duties of
compensation and remedy.
There is by now a very rich literature on the circumstances under which
CMAs can become morally responsible for their actions.2 However, less attention
has been paid to the question of corporate moral rights (CMRs). We commonly
attribute legal rights to corporate entities. For example, in most jurisdictions
business corporations have the right to own property as unitary entities. But do
CMAs also have corporate moral rights? While claims about legal rights refer to
entitlements in actual legal systems, claims about moral rights are prescriptive.
They are grounded in moral reasons and can therefore challenge existing legal
arrangements.3 Furthermore, moral rights do not necessarily entail legal protec-
tions. They give their holder a moral entitlement, and can therefore serve to
justify moral duties for other agents in the world, independently of legal
arrangements (I discuss examples in Section V).4
It is commonly assumed, and I proceed on this assumption, that individuals
have moral rights. Human rights, for example, are often conceived as basic
moral protections, which all humans are entitled to by virtue of their human
agency (and which give grounds to legal protections as well). The corporate
moral agency thesis suggests that corporate entities are members of our moral
community – they are capable of moral reasoning, and are the appropriate
1 Some authors suggest that non-structural groups can also qualify as moral agents. See, e. g.,
LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND
CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987). In what follows, I leave to the side that debate, and focus on
structural groups, whose corporate agency is more easily asserted.
2 For a general review of that literature, see Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/collective-responsibility/.
3 PETER JONES, RIGHTS 8 (1994).
4 Of course, moral rights provide an argument for legal rights. But they do not always entail
legal rights, as there might be countervailing considerations at play. I do not examine the
implication of the proposed framework for corporate legal rights.
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subjects of moral responsibility. Does it follow, then, that they too are entitled to
moral protections?5
It’s worth noting that “collective rights,” i. e. rights that attach to groups in
some sense, have received a fair amount of attention in earlier debates on the
rights of minority cultures and of ethnic and linguistic communities.6 However,
these debates did not address the specific question I am interested in here,
namely whether corporate moral agency grounds a group’s claim to corporate
rights, i. e. moral protections, liberties and powers, that attach to it, over and
above its members. In fact, many advocates of minority and cultural rights are
suspicious of claims about the separate moral agency of the groups they discuss,
and do not argue for CMRs.7 Instead they opt for a notion of “shared rights” –
rights that are jointly held by individual group members (such as the right of all
members of a certain religion to religious protections).8 There are some authors
in the debate around cultural and religious rights who do argue for CMRs, for
example – they defend moral entitlements that attach to tribes or churches.9
However, these authors too do not pay much attention to the question of
whether it is a group’s moral agency that justifies granting those rights.
This paper then explores the connection between corporate agents’ status as
moral agents, and their moral entitlements, or rights. The position I develop is as
follows: Corporate moral agency cannot, in itself, ground a group’s claim for
moral rights, because CMAs are not the type of being whose wellbeing is
sufficient, in itself, to ground moral rights claims. Nevertheless, CMRs can be
substantiated, if they are necessary for the protection of individual rights. Put
differently, CMAs can, and often do, have derivative CMRs: Rights that concep-
tually attach to them, but which are morally grounded in the interests of other
agents in the world. Furthermore, the corporate moral agency thesis has an
important role to play in our understanding of CMRs: it identifies the type of
rights that only groups who are moral agents can enjoy (as opposed to other
5 Corporate moral rights can take the form of claims, liberties, powers and immunities. The
examples I discuss, e. g. the right to vote, usually involve a combination of Hohfeldian
incidents. Cf. CARL WELLMAN, REAL RIGHTS 107 (1995).
6 For review, see Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353 (1999).
7 Such suspicions make sense, given that the groups that are usually under discussion in these
debates, e. g. ethnic communities and religious groups, lack organizational structure, and it is
debatable whether they comply with the conditions for corporate agency.
8 See, e. g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 140 (1991). JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207–09 (1986).
9 See, e. g., MARLIES GALENKAMP, INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS (1993). Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49
AM. J. JURIS. 127 (2004).
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groups), given their moral agency. One such right, I argue, is the right not be
morally subverted, which CMAs hold against their members and against other
agents in the world.
The paper develops as follows: Section I explains the corporate moral
agency thesis, and the distinction between conceptual and substantial justifica-
tions of corporate rights. Section II rejects two approaches to CMRs. According to
the first, CMAs have an equal moral standing, and equivalent moral rights, to
individual moral agents. According to the second, given that CMAs are not full
persons, they do not have CMRs. Section III presents my alternative view, which
argues that CMAs can, conceptually, have specific moral rights, but those rights
must be justified in light of the rights of their individual members, as well as
those of other individuals in the world. One important moral right which flows
from corporate moral agency, and on which is I expand in Section IV, is the right
not to be morally subverted. Section V provides one example of the implications
of the proposed theoretical framework, by arguing that states have a right, held
against their citizens, not to be morally subverted.
I. Corporate Moral Agency
Social groups come in all shapes and sizes. They vary from the small and
intimate to the massive and impersonal; from cooperative ventures to highly
hierarchical organisations, from voluntary and open associations to coerced,
closed structures. This extensive variety might cast a doubt on our ability to
engage in a systematic and unified analysis of groups’ rights and responsibil-
ities. However, recent literature has identified a specific set of groups which
share in common some unique features. These features set these groups apart
from other groups, and invite a discussion about their normative status.
The groups I am referring to are groups that, in light of their internal
structure, comply with standard requirements of moral agency. An early and
influential account of such groups was offered by Peter French, who focused
predominantly on the business corporation as a moral entity.10 More recent work
has expanded the analysis to other groups as well. In what follows I focus on
Christian List and Phillip Pettit, who develop a powerful account of corporate
moral agency, which, they suggest, applies to a wide variety of political, com-
mercial and civic groups, from political parties, governments and states, to trade
unions, professional organisations and business corporations, and churches,
10 PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 31–49 (1984).
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clubs and universities.11 List and Pettit argue that although these groups differ in
size and purpose they all share in common a specific internal structure, which
renders them moral agents in and of themselves, over and above their members.
As such, they are members of our moral community, and therefore there is room
to explore what responsibilities and rights attach to them.12
The claim that groups can qualify as moral agents has been subject to
criticism from “individualist theorists.” As I mention earlier, these scholars reject
the claim that groups are autonomous moral agents, and argue that “collective
rights” (e. g. rights to collective goods such as language or religion), can only
attach jointly and directly to individual group members. 13 In this paper, I do not
attempt to engage with such critiques. Rather, my goal is to explore whether, if
indeed a group is a moral agent, it follows that it has CMRs.
According to List and Pettit, rational agents are able to maintain consistency
between their representational states (beliefs), motivational states (desires) and
their actions.14 Groups find it hard to be rational agents, because their beliefs
and desires are constituted by those of their members, and simple aggregation
mechanisms of these often-conflicting beliefs and desires (e. g., simple major-
itatrianism) will inevitably lead to inconsistencies (List and Pettit refer to this as
“the discursive dilemma”). However, standardly, groups would have a strong
incentive to be rational, because on-going inconsistencies between beliefs and
desires undermine the group’s capacity to perform the roles they were set up for.
The solution takes the form of a decision-making procedure which “collectivises
reason”: it collects members’ attitudes on separate premises, and then “lets logic
decide the outcome.”15 When members agree to collectivise in this way, the
result of the group’s decision making process – what the group ends up “believ-
ing” or “desiring” – can be different from what some or even all group members
11 CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 39–40 (2011). Other important works on
corporate agency include David Copp, What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism, and Legal
Theory, 23 DIALOGUE 249 (1984). ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1999).
12 To clarify, some real-world specimen of these groups (states, churches. parties etc.) do not
comply with List and Pettit’s criteria for moral agency. For example, Toni Erskine has argued
that “failed states” lack moral agency (Toni Erskine, Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional
Moral Agents: The Case of States and Quasi States, 15 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (2001).). My concern
here is with the typical group in each category, which is reasonably functioning and hence
complying with the suggested criteria.
13 Jan Narveson, Collective Rights?, 4 CAN. J. LAW JURIS. 329 (1991). Edmund Wall, Problems
with the Group Rights Thesis, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 269 (2003). WELLMAN, supra note 5, at 157–65.
14 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 11, at 19–25.
15 Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS: THE NATURE OF
SOCIAL REALITY 171 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003).
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desire and believe. The group then has a “mind of its own,” which supervenes
upon, but is autonomous to, the mind of its individual members.16
List and Pettit suggest, then, that groups which can form consistent beliefs
and desires (through a central decision making procedure which “collectivises
reason”), and which are able to act on their desires (through relevant authority
and command structures) are rational agents. The next step in their account is to
suggest that some group agents also qualify as moral agents. Corporate moral
agents are group agents that are able to bring into their decision-making process
considerations about right and wrong, good and bad.17 It follows, then that in
Rawlsian terms, CMAs possess the two moral powers: First, they have a capacity
for normative reasoning, and they are able to regulate their conduct in accor-
dance with good moral reasons. Second, they have a capacity to conceive their
own good and to pursue it.18 At this level too what the group deems to be
morally desirable through its decision-making process is not reducible to its
individual members’ normative judgements, and hence there is room to treat its
judgements separately from those of the members’.
With this framework in mind, we can now return to the question of the
implications of corporate moral agency for CMRs. Does the fact that some groups
qualify as moral agents in themselves imply, in any sense, that they are entitled
to moral rights, and if so – to which rights? In answering these questions, we
should distinguish between two possible connections between moral agency
and rights.19 The first connection is conceptual. At this level, we investigate
whether CMAs are the type of thing to which moral rights attach. The second
connection is substantive: Here we investigate whether there are sufficiently
strong normative reasons to grant a CMA a right. These two levels of analysis are
separate but related: if CMAs are not the type of thing to which a moral right can
attach, then (as the aforementioned critics of corporate moral agency thesis
would confirm) there is no point to ask substantive questions about their
entitlement to that right. Examining the nature of group agency, and the type
of rights it might conceptually have, are therefore necessary steps in order to
determine whether or not CMAs have moral rights. However, the full answer to
the question requires also a substantive discussion about the moral reasons that
ground those rights.
16 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 11, at 76–77.
17 Id. at 158.
18 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (1995). Rawls attributes the two moral powers to
individual agents, but List and Pettit’s analysis suggest that we can find similar capacities in
group agents.
19 Cf. Adina Preda, Group Rights and Group Agency, 9 J. MORAL PHIL. 229–30 (2013).
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At this point one may ask whether, given the immense variety of CMAs we
find in the world, there is any point to discussing their rights at this general
level. Would it not make more sense to examine whether specific groups (e. g.
business corporations, or universities, or states) should be granted specific
moral rights (e. g. the right to own property, or the right to free speech)?20 In
response I would argue that, while determining which specific CMRs specific
CMAs have is an important stage in the investigation – and one I engage with in
Section V, where I discuss a specific CMR that attaches to the state – it must be
preceded by an outlining of the general process by which we should go about
exploring such specific examples. Indeed, many deniers of CMRs deny the very
starting point of this process, by suggesting that CMAs cannot have CMRs. The
objection is made at the general level, pertaining to the idea of corporate agency
itself. It is therefore fitting to address it by examining whether CMAs can in
principle have moral rights (I address this critique in Section III). Moreover, as I
argue in Section IV, there are certain moral rights that are conceptually derived
from the very status of moral agency, and which therefore, in principle, all CMAs
could claim. One such right is the right not to be morally subverted. Establishing
that claim also requires looking at the idea of corporate moral agency at a
general level.
II. From Equal Standing to No Standing
One attempt to link between corporate moral agency and CMRs highlights the
similarities between CMAs and individual moral agents. On this view, given that
CMAs have “a mind of their own” and a capacity to engage in moral reasoning,
they have an equal moral standing to that of individuals. We find an oft-cited
statement in this vein in an early work of French, where he argues that business
corporations are “full-fledged moral persons” and have “whatever privileges,
rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to all members
of the moral community.”21 French retracted from this statement in his later
work, and it’s hard to find other advocates of the corporate moral agency thesis
who support it.22 However, we should not brush aside this assertion too quickly,
as one might wonder whether it is not the logical follow-up of the corporate
20 I thank the editor of Law & Ethics of Human Rights for pressing me to address this objection.
21 FRENCH, supra note 10, at 32.
22 PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS 10 (1995).
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moral agency thesis. This suggestion was recently made by John Hasnas.23
Hasnas focuses specifically on the moral right to democratic participation, and
in what follows I use this example as well. However, the structure of his
argument applies to other important moral rights, such as the right to free
speech, or the right to hold property.24
Hasnas’s starting point is the “all-subjected principle” of democracy. As he
interprets this principle, it grounds the moral right of those who are subject to
the law, to participate in the making of the law.25 To be “subject to the law”
means “bearing full responsibility for conforming one’s behaviour to the law.”26
It follows that only moral agents, capable of autonomous decision-making,
normative judgment and self-control are subject to the law. Hasnas argues
that if, as List and Pettit suggest, corporate agents are, typically, also moral
agents – with their own interests and goals which they need to conform to the
law – it follows that they too are subjects to the law and hence have a moral
right to democratic participation, independently of their members.27 Given the
counter-intuitive implications of this conclusion, it constitutes “a reductio of
corporate moral agency.”28
However, Hasnas’s rejection of the corporate moral agency encounters a
fundamental problem. Its key weakness, I would argue, is that it switches too
quickly from conceptual to substantive arguments about CMRs. Hasnas success-
fully demonstrates that conceptually it makes sense to grant CMAs a right to
democratic participation in the institutions that govern them. In other words, he
demonstrates that CMAs are the type of things that can participate in democratic
politics, given that they are capable of autonomous decision making, normative
judgment and self-control. Granting them a right to vote makes sense, in a way
that granting the right to vote to a coffee-making machine, or to a young child,
or to a group that is made of a random collection of individuals without decision
making procedures that “collectivise reason” does not. This is indeed an impor-
tant insight we can draw from List and Pettit’s work.
But the fact that corporate group agents could exercise a right to vote, and
may well have a corporate interest in a right to vote, does not entail that there
23 John Hasnas, Should Corporations have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of
Corporate Moral Agency (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
24 These moral rights would translate into legal rights in reasonably just legal systems.
However, my concern here is not with legal formulations but with the normative basis of
such rights.
25 Hasnas, supra note 23, at 11.
26 Id. at 12.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 3.
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are substantial reasons to grant them this moral protection. To see the missing
step in the argument consider Joseph Raz’s formulation of the “interest theory of
rights,” which I use throughout this paper.29 Raz argues that “X has a right if
and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s
wellbeing (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to
be under a duty.”30 This definition does not imply that if a CMA’s has an
interest, and even a strong interest, in democratic participation, it has the
right to democratic participation.31 As Raz’s definition clearly implies, to ground
such a right in a corporate interest we need to show that the corporate interest is
sufficient, in and of itself, to hold others under a duty.32 List and Pettit argue
that this cannot be the case. Here they invoke “normative individualism,”
namely the view “that something is good only if it is good for individual
human, or, more generally, sentient beings.”33 “Normative individualism” offers
a benchmark for what counts as a valid substantive reason for judging whether
or not an agent has a moral right. Accordingly, the fact that voting rights protect
CMAs’ vital interests is not sufficient to ground their moral right to vote, because
that interest is not a valid moral consideration, it itself. Hasnas is right to point
out that List and Pettit merely state their adherence to “normative individual-
ism,” without providing an argument for that view. But on the other hand, he
too does not give a substantive argument in support of the claim that having an
autonomous agency is a necessary and sufficient moral reason to grant an entity
the right to vote, or other moral rights. If normative individualism turns out to be
an attractive view, then supporters of the corporate moral agency could adopt it,
and reject the equal standing view, whilst holding on to the claim that CMAs are
the type of thing to which moral rights could attach.34
29 Notice that one could ground the moral right to vote in the will theory as well. On the
relation between the conceptual and substantive levels of analysis in the will theory, see Preda,
supra note 19.
30 RAZ, supra note 8, at 166.
31 Notice that Raz accepts the conceptual possibility of corporate rights when he states that
“whatever explains and accounts for the existence of [corporate] persons who can act, be
subject to duties etc. also accounts for their capacity to have rights” (id. at 176). Cf. Matthew
Kramer, Rights without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS, 79 (Matthew Kramer et al. eds.,
1998).
32 MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 59 (1986).
33 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 11, at 182.
34 While I do not think Hasnas’s rejection of the corporate moral agency succeeds, his analysis
is important in highlighting that, given the rise of the corporate agency, democratic theorists
must engage more seriously with the question of what (if anything) grants individual agents, as
opposed to corporate agents, democratic participation rights.
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Is normative individualism an attractive view? Answering this question in
depth is beyond the scope of the current paper, but it is worth noting that it is a
foundational pillar of contemporary liberal ethics. In what follows I merely
mention one recent defence of this idea, which is offered by Kendy Hess.35
Hess’s account is of special relevance to the current analysis, because she
draws from it conclusions that are radically different to “the equal standing
view.” Hess’s analysis implies that CMAs should not be granted CMRs, however,
I believe this conclusion goes too far in the other direction.
Unlike many deniers of CMRs, Hess accepts that groups can be moral
agents. However, she suggests that they are not moral persons in the relevant
sense. Hess distinguishes between two conceptions of personhood.36 The first is
a functional conception, according to which a person has rational capacities that
enable it to enter the “social contract,” thus accepting political rights and
duties.37 The second is an experiential conception, according to which to be a
person is something that experiences, that is able to have senses, emotions and
passions, and that is able to engage in meaningful relationship with others.38 As
we already saw, the corporate moral agency thesis demonstrates that CMAs are
persons in the functional sense; but it does not ground corporate personhood in
the experiential sense. Hess argues that this fact poses a fundamental problem
for defenders of CMRs, because our standard set of liberal moral attaches to
experience and vulnerability: only beings that can experience suffering are
exposed to bad things like hunger, pain or isolation, and “it is precisely this
vulnerability that accounts for the rights and protections that are typically
awarded to [persons].”39
Hess’s rich analysis of personhood offers one persuasive justification for
normative individualism, which, as I noted earlier, is missing from List and
Pettit’s account. Accordingly, it is not rational and even moral capacities that
ground a being’s moral standing to demand rights protections. Rather, it is the
ability to have emotions and to experience pain (and pleasure) that is necessary
and sufficient for one’s wellbeing to be morally significant. In what follows I
accept Hess’s justification of normative individualism, and proceed on the
assumption that only individuals’ (or sentient beings’) wellbeing matters,
35 Kendy M. Hess, “If You Tickle Us …”: How Corporations Can Be Moral Agents Without Being
Persons, 47 J. VALUE INQ. 319 (2013).
36 There are other conceptions of personhood in Hess’s paper, but they are not relevant for the
current analysis.
37 Hess, supra note 35, at 331.
38 Id. at 333.
39 Id. Cf. Michael Hartney, Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. JURIS. 
(1991).
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morally.40 However, there are reasons to think that Hess draws too strong
conclusions from this assumption. For on one interpretation of her account,
given the connection between experiential personhood and moral rights, CMAs
have no claim to CMRs. This conclusion is evident in her claim that “all of the
rights we now claim to ourselves … are best understood as further efforts to
protect ourselves and other persons from those who would exploit our vulner-
abilities.”41 And, yet, I would argue that Hess’s version of normative individu-
alism does not necessarily ground the conclusion that CMAs cannot have any
rights. For there is a different route for grounding CMRs that does not rely on
their moral personhood. On this route, CMRs can be substantively grounded in
the wellbeing of agents that matter, namely individuals (or sentient beings). In
the next section I turn to explore this idea.
III. From Individual Rights to CMRs
My defense of CMRs takes a middle ground between the two views I discuss. On
the one hand, unlike “the equal standing view,” I accept normative individual-
ism and its insistence on the exclusive value of sentient beings. On the other
hand, unlike Hess, I argue that group agents can and do have moral rights that
attach to them, rather than to their members. This approach takes the lead from
Dwight Newman’s analysis of CMRs, but it also offers important revisions to it.42
Newman’s position is based on the interest theory of rights. His starting
point is the observation (shared by List and Pettit) that groups can have corpo-
rate interests that are not reducible to the interests of their members.43 It follows
that, conceptually, given that they have corporate interests, CMAs qualify as
40 I cannot provide a fuller defense of this version of normative individualism in the scope of
this paper. There is a rich body of literature around this issue, much of it challenges the original
Kantian view that only moral agents have moral standing. Examples that are often mentioned in
that debate are young children and animals, whom we commonly think have moral rights even
though they lack moral agency. For one powerful rejection of the Kantian thesis, see Christine
M. Korsgaard, Facing the Animal You See in the Mirror, IVX HARV. REV. PHIL. 4 (2009).
Korsgaard’s account is compatible with Hess’s and provides additional arguments for it.
41 Hess, supra note 35, at 333 (emphasis added).
42 Newman, supra note 9.
43 Newman does not explicitly limit his analysis to CMAs, but the examples he gives are of
such entities (e. g. unions, churches and states). (Id. at 140–46). I remain skeptical that we can
speak of non-reducible group interest in the absence of institutional mechanisms that can
separate the agency of the group from that of its members. I therefore limit my analysis to
corporate agents that follow List and Pettit’s prescriptions.
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potential right holders. Next, Newman suggests that a corporate interest gives
rise to a CMR if and only if the protection of that interest is necessary for the
protection of the group members’ rights. As he explains, “if we accept individual
rights, we presuppose certain collective rights”44 because there is a “necessary
dependence of certain individual interests on collective interests.”45 Returning
to Raz’s formulation, a CMA has a CMR if it is necessary to fulfil a certain aspect
of a group’s wellbeing (its interest), which is itself necessary for the fulfilment of
group members’ wellbeing (their interest), and that aspect of group members’
wellbeing (their interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s)
to be under a duty (i. e., it constitutes a right).46
While this formulation of CMRs is context-dependent, there are many exam-
ples in our world to which it applies. Consider the example of religious free-
doms. We commonly think that individuals have a moral right to freedom of
religion. But many religions and religious practices have a collective nature:
they revolve around organized structures, or institutions, that have a distinct
and autonomous identity over time (e. g. the Church). Without those institutions,
their followers’ individual right to freedom of religion would become mean-
ingless. It therefore follows that these institutions are entitled to moral protec-
tions that would allow them to maintain their autonomous identity (for example,
protections from state interference). Thus, “the individual right to freedom of
religion presupposes the fulfillment of certain collective interests of religious
collectivities.”47
But in what sense does a right like protection from state interference attach
to the Church rather than to its members? An answer to this question can be
found in standard conceptualisations of the rights of role-holders (such as
policemen or judges). As Matthew Kramer and Hillel Steiner explain – in
response to the critique that such rights cannot be explained by the interest
theory, because they protect the interests of third parties – role holders have an
interest in being able to perform their role.48 In fact, this is what role holders
desire in virtue of them being role holders. Going back to the distinction between
conceptual and substantive arguments for rights, we can say that the idea here
44 Newman’s use of the term “collective” is equivalent to the term “corporate” as deployed in
this paper.
45 Newman, supra note 9, at 158, 159.
46 Other versions of this middle path appear in Vinit Haksar, Collective Rights and the Value of
Groups, 41 INQ. 21 (1998). Jones, supra note 6.
47 Newman, supra note 9, at 161. In Section V, I discuss the example of reasonably just states,
whose CMRs are necessary for the protection of individual rights.
48 Matthew Kramer & Hillel Steiner, Theories of Rights: Is there a Third Way?, 27 OX. J. LEGAL
STUD. 291 (2007). Cf. Kramer, supra note 31, at 80–81.
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is that the rights of role-holders are theirs at the conceptual level: They attach to
the agent that has a capacity and interest to perform the role. That said,
substantively, we would need additional arguments to ground the claim that a
role holder has the right to perform their role, and these arguments would
usually pertain to other agents. After all, it would be strange to argue that the
fact that a policewoman has an interest in arresting a suspect is sufficient, in
and of itself, to grant the policewoman that right. Rather, the right can only be
justified in light of citizens’ (sufficiently strong) interests in security and the rule
of law.
We are thus led to the conclusion that the rights of role holders would often
be “derivative” rather than “original” rights.49 As Meir Dan-Cohen explains,
original rights are granted to an agent A out of concern for A itself. In other
words, the substantive reasons they rely on relate to A’s own interests.
Derivative rights, on the other hand, are rights that are granted to an agent A,
but out of concern for another entity. A derivative moral right is properly
ascribed to A, because A has the capacity to enjoy that right, and “may rely
on it to solicit a decision in her favour, granting her a particular benefit.”50 So,
to give another example, a parent’s right to make a decision about her child’s
education is not the child’s right to make the same decision (given that children
lack the necessary capacities to make such a decision). It is a liberty that the
parent can claim for herself, or the parent can exercise, and which, as such,
attach to her. However, at the same time it is grounded in the child’s own
interests.
Newman’s justification of CMRs must take a parallel route: for it too sug-
gests that conceptually, a CMR is tied to an interest of a group agent and protects
that interest; but that substantively, the right is grounded in reasons that pertain
to the interests of the group’s members. As such, it can only be a derivative
CMR.51 By way of illustration, consider the right of states to sign international
49 “Often” rather than “always” because it might be possible to find a case where a role
holder’s interest is also a sufficient justification for their right.
50 DAN-COHEN, supra note 32, at 58.
51 Some critics of the interest theory of rights find Kramer and Steiner’s reply to the “third
party’s interest” challenge unsatisfactory. The debates between defenders and critics of the
interest theory are intricate, and go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it’s worth
pointing out that CMRs could be grounded in other theories of rights. For an exploration of how
they fit the will theory of rights, see Preda, supra note 19. Another interesting candidate is Leif
Wenar’s recent “kind-desire” theory of rights, which aims to resolve the aforementioned “third
party’s interest” challenge (Leif Wenar, The Nature of Claim Rights, 123 ETHICS (2013)). Wenar
suggests that, conceptually, rights correspond to a right-holder’s desires given her role or kind
(genus), that certain duties toward her would be fulfilled: for example, the desire of a judge,
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treaties. This is a legal right in international law, but we commonly think it is
grounded in states’ moral entitlements (I expand on these in Section V).
Conceptually, it is plausible to argue that the right attaches to the state, in the
sense that it protects a state’s moral interest in maintaining legal autonomy. It is
not the citizenry – the aggregated collection of citizens that are subject to the
state authority – that has the right to sign treaties, given that we can hardly
imagine the citizenry, as an unstructured aggregation of individuals, being able
to exercise such a right. But in order to be successful, the state’s moral claim to
legal autonomy must be supported by moral arguments that pertain to its
citizens’ interest in a functioning political authority.
A second modification to Newman’s account concerns his exclusive focus
on the interests of group members when considering substantive arguments for
CMRs.52 Other advocates of CMRs make similar claims.53 But it’s not clear why
the substantive reasons that are used to justify CMRs are limited to the inter-
ests of group members. It may be the case that, empirically, a group agent’s
members are the most likely to be affected by the group agent, or that the
relevant functions of the group agent, which we want to protect, relate pre-
dominantly to group members. But, if we accept normative individualism we
must reject a view that is exclusively concerned with the interests of group
members in the substantive discussion over the content of a group’s CMR.
Clearly, there are important questions to ask about the right balance between
members’ and non-members’ wellbeing when considering a group’s claim to
moral protection, and the answer to such questions could change in light of
the nature of the group in question and its relation to its members. But as a
general rule, normative individualism dictates that fundamentally all indivi-
duals (or sentient beings) matter, at some level. So if CMRs are to be justified in
light of their function with relation to individual (or sentient beings) interests,
we ought to give consideration to the interests of both members and non-
members.
qua judge, is that she is able to perform her role, or the desire of an animal, qua animal, is that
it should not to be tortured and so on. CMR will fit into this framework in the following way: a
CMA has rights that correlate to the duties on others that the CMA would desire to be fulfilled
qua CMA. A CMA has moral rights that correlate to the duties on others that the CMA has valid
moral reasons to want to be fulfilled. Given moral individualism, the moral reasons we would
count as valid in this context would be reasons that pertain to the wellbeing of the individual
members of the group (and, as I suggest below, of other individuals in the world).
52 Newman, supra note 9, at 140–41.
53 See, e. g., Haksar, supra note 46, at 31. Jones, supra note 6, at 374.
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IV. The Right Not to Be Morally Subverted
The previous section pointed to the process by which we determine whether a
CMA is entitled to a moral protection: in the first stage, we determine which
functions the CMA serves in the world, and which of these functions are valu-
able, in the sense that they are necessary for the fulfilment of individual rights in
a meaningful way. Here, as I emphasised, we should take into account the
interests of both group members and non-group members. In the second
stage, we determine which moral protections the group requires, at the corpo-
rate level, in order to be able to execute its role. The group is entitled to these
moral protections, if there is a sufficiently strong substantive justification for
them. Often, at this stage we would also have to balance groups’ CMR claims
against other rights claims: A group’s CMR might be necessary for the protection
of some individual rights, but at the same time may undermine another set of
individuals’ rights claims. In such cases, we would need to engage with the
usual process of rights balancing, and judge which side has the stronger sub-
stantive argument in its favour.54
Some might find this proposal a disappointing answer to the question with
which I opened this paper, namely – does corporate moral agency entail CMRs?
For it appears that corporate moral agency is neither necessary nor sufficient to
ground CMRs: It is not necessary, because if all that matters is the function that
a group plays in the world then, presumably, groups that are not CMAs but who
nevertheless play an important function might also be entitled to CMRs.55 And it
is not sufficient because, as we saw, a CMA’s interest cannot by itself ground
moral protections.56 This disappointment is not entirely misplaced, but in my
view, it is unavoidable if we wish to hold on to normative individualism. That
said, we should be wary not to overlook an important and weighty conceptual
connection between corporate moral agency and CMRs. For corporate moral
agency is necessary to ground specific CMRs. After all, there are rights that,
conceptually, can only attach to groups that are CMAs. I have already mentioned
one example – the right to vote, which requires at the minimum the ability to
engage in moral reasoning and to have control over one’s actions.
Another right that is tied directly to a group’s moral agency and moral
powers, and which has received less attention in the literature, is the right not
54 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503–19 (1989).
55 For example, as “moral patients,” see Keith Graham, The Moral Significance of Collective
Entities, 44 INQ. 21 (2001).
56 Cf. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism about Corporate Rights, in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 361 (Micah Schwartzman & Zoë Robinson eds., 2013).
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to be morally subverted. This right is invoked by Jeffery Howard, who focuses on
individual moral agents.57 His starting point is the two Rawlsian moral powers,
which individual agents standardly possess. As Howard points out, political-
liberal literature has paid ample attention to the way in which the state can
undermine citizens’ second moral power – namely the capacity to conceive
one’s own rational advantage and conception of the good – by subjecting
them to paternalistic policies. But less attention has been paid to the way in
which moral agents’ first moral power can be undermined by external interfer-
ence. According to Howard, moral agents’ capacity for moral reasoning can be
wrongly subverted by other agents, and when that happens, they are more likely
to fail to engage in proper normative reasoning or to act on good moral reasons.
A morally subverted agent acts wrongly, and is blameworthy for that, but her
wrongdoing is at least partly caused by other agents’ interference, and they too
should be held into account.
Moral subversion can take various forms: it can motivational, as when agent
A creates a strong reason for agent B to act wrongly (e. g. offer her financial
incentives to do wrong); and it can be epistemic, as when agent A causes the
formation of false normative beliefs in agent B.58 Howard forcefully argues that,
given the foundational importance of the two moral powers to our human
agency, we have a right to be protected from such subversions. In other
words, other agents have the duty to refrain from undermining our capacity
for good moral reasoning, and to support us in maintaining that capacity.59
When agent A subverts agent B, and instigates her to do wrong, A fails to respect
B as a moral agent, and in that sense A wrongs B (as well as the victims of B’s
wrongdoing).60
Howard’s discussion focuses on individuals’ right not to be morally sub-
verted. But it is easy to see that CMAs, who, as we already saw, by definition
also possess the two Rawlsian powers, are also vulnerable to moral subversion.
CMAs are vulnerable to what one may call “interactional subversions” by other
agents; and they are also vulnerable to what one may call “structural subver-
sion,” namely subversion in the form of laws that foreseeably set them up to fail
57 Jeffrey W. Howard, Moral Subversion and Structural Entrapment, 26 J. POL. PHIL. 24 (2016).
58 Id. at 31.
59 Id. at 30. Howard sets various limits on the scope of that duty, e. g. that the subverting
activity should foreseeably affect the moral capacities of the subverted agent, and that is not a
“morally protected” activity. In what follows, I accept those limits.
60 Notice that Howard’s argument is limited to moral duties. He does not argue that the duty
not to subvert others should be legally enforced (as that question depends on other considera-
tions as well).
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morally.61 At the interactional level, CMAs are vulnerable, for example, to direct
subversions from their group members, e. g. members who intentionally struc-
ture the group’s decision-making process in a way that would hamper its ability
to properly engage in moral reasoning; or who hide relevant information that
would generate proper moral reasoning at the corporate level. At the structural
level, consider for example the legal practice of shareholders’ limited liability in
the context of corporate ethics. Some authors argue that this legal arrangement
incentivises business corporations to engage in morally hazardous activities,
such as activities which can potentially generate a higher profit margin, but
which are also more likely to lead to accidents. Corporations are prone to engage
in such activities because limited liability protections guarantee that their costs
would fall on victims rather than on shareholders. If it is the case that limited
liability encourages such behaviour, then it follows that regulations that allow it
are morally subversive: they provide business corporations with strong incen-
tives to act in a morally irresponsible manner.62
The fact that CMAs are vulnerable to moral subversion implies that, con-
ceptually, we can identify a CMR not to be morally subverted. As the preceding
analysis demonstrated, to ground such a right we also need to provide substan-
tive argument that demonstrates the necessary dependence of individuals’ (or
sentient beings’) relevant interests on the corporate right not to be subverted.
Such a demonstration must be done on a case by case basis, so in the next
section I expand on this connection with regard to one dominant CMA in our
world, namely the state.
V. The Moral Rights of States
In this section I turn to demonstrate the applicability of the account for the
specific case of the state. For the purposes of this discussion, I define the state as
an institutional legal order with a monopoly over the legitimate use of organized
violence, an internal and external sovereignty, and whose authority is exercised
61 Id. at 37.
62 It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether limited liability is indeed morally
problematic in this specific way. For arguments in support of this claim, see, e. g., CHRISTOPHER
KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 237–40 (2000). Andrew G. Haldane,
Bank of England, Who Owns a Company? University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance
Conference, May 22, 2015, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/
speeches/2015/833.aspx.
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over a collection of individuals (society) and within a defined territory.63 There is
a rather widespread agreement amongst advocates of the corporate moral
agency thesis that properly functioning states are prime examples of CMAs.64
While international law grants states a wide range of corporate legal rights, my
concern here is with the CMRs of states.
As the framework from Section III entails, a state would have a specific
CMR, if and only if it is the type of entity that is capable of exercising that right,
and if that right protects a corporate interest, that is necessary for the mean-
ingful fulfilment of the rights of individual agents (taking into account both the
state’s citizens and other agents in the world). One may recognize the structure
of this argument from recent debates about states’ authority. We commonly
assume that reasonably just states have legitimate authority over their subjects.
Legitimate authority translates into the moral right to demand obedience.65
According to one dominant defence of reasonably just states’ legitimate author-
ity, it is grounded in the fact that the state is necessary in order to secure
citizens’ basic rights to security and freedom.66
Another related set of states’ CMRs that have been formulated in this way
are territorial rights (standardly understood as the right to territorial jurisdiction;
the right to resources in a given territory, and the right to control the borders of a
given territory). Recent analyses of these rights suggest that they attach to states
because they are necessary for the protection of citizens’ rights.67 As one author
writes in that vein: “states have territorial rights because their jurisdiction serves
the interests of their subjects.”68 Using the framework I developed here we can
say that, on these views, conceptually, the state is the agent who holds territor-
ial rights, but substantively the rights are grounded in the rights of the popula-
tion over which the state exercises authority.
Some have questioned the viability of states’ CMRs, by arguing that the
proper agent to whom rights like the right to territorial jurisdiction attach is not
the state, but the members of the state. For example, Margaret Moore argues that
territorial rights attach to “peoples,” namely groups of individuals who reside in
a specific territory and have “the viable capacity to establish and maintain
63 This definition is borrowed from WENDT, supra note 11, at 201–14.
64 For elaboration, see id.
65 Richard B. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in AUTHORITY 56
(Joseph Raz ed., 1990).
66 This defence draws on Kant. For elaboration, see ANNA STILZ, LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEODM
OBLIGATION AND THE STATE (2009).
67 See, e. g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF DETERMINATION (2004). Lea
Ypi, A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights, 22 EUR. J. PHIL. 288 (2014).
68 Anna Stilz, Nations, States and Territory, 112 ETHICS 578 (2011).
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political institutions.”69 Moore argues that members of peoples have a shared
right to collective self-determination, which involves shaping the conditions of
their existence through their political institutions. This right translates into the
standard set of territorial rights. Moore’s justification for territorial rights recog-
nises that the political institutions of the state are necessary in order for a
people’s right to self-determination to be realised, but she nevertheless main-
tains that, given that territorial rights stem from the shared right of collective
self-determination, “the people are the fundamental holder of territorial
rights.”70
However, I am not convinced that Moore successfully demonstrates that,
conceptually, a “people” is the type of agent that can hold territorial rights such
as the right to territorial jurisdictional. As I have argued in Section II, there are
rights that can only attach to CMAs, given that they require certain abilities that
only CMAs have. Jurisdictional authority is clearly a right of this type. For only a
corporate agent that possess the two moral powers and that is able to act
autonomously can exercise this right. Moore states that a people is a group
with the capacity to establish and maintain political institutions. Put differently,
this statement implies that “a people” has the capacity create and support a
state agent. But I would argue that in order to be the appropriate holder of the
right to territorial jurisdiction, a group needs more than the capacity to create a
corporate agent. It must have the capacity to exercise jurisdictional authority,
and the people – in the aggregate form – simply does not have that capacity.
The state, on the other hand, has that capacity, given its relevant decision-
making procedures and authority structures. Once a people has created a state
agent, it is that agent which conceptually holds territorial rights. Moore is right
to argue that fundamentally, that right is grounded in the shared interests of the
state members (or the people); but conceptually it is hard to see how it can lie
with any other agent but the state.
Assuming my critique of Moore is correct, we can agree with statist theorists
that the functions that states serve grant them a familiar set of CMRs, including
“internal rights,” directed at their citizens (e. g. the right to be obeyed); and
“external rights” directed at other agents in the world (e. g. the right the
territorial jurisdiction). To that familiar set I would add, perhaps more contro-
versially, the right not to be morally subverted. In what follows I explain how
this right applies to states and the implications for their citizens.
The claim that states have a right not be morally subverted assumes, at its
background, a theory about our normative expectations of states. The questions:
69 MARGARET MOORE, A POLITICAL THEORY OF TERRITORY 50 (2015).
70 Id. at 96.
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what states owe their citizens and also what they owe other agents in the world,
such as vulnerable populations in distant countries, have been the subject of
heated debates in recent decades. For example, some argue that states have only
very basic negative duties to respect the human rights of non-members, whilst
others argue for a much more extensive set of positive duties, including duties of
assistance and even redistributive duties. My goal here is not to contribute to
that debate, but rather to point out that any theory we have about the functions
that states ought to play in the world vis-a-vis their own citizens and non-
members would conceptually imply that they have the right not to be morally
subverted. For if we develop a normative expectation that states engage in moral
reasoning that would lead to the recognition of their moral duties, and if we
acknowledge that this normative expectation could be frustrated, if a state’s first
moral power is undermined through subversion, it follows that we should
recognize the conceptual possibility of the state’s right against subversion.
I now turn to explore the substantive arguments for the state’s right not to
be subverted. As we saw, a substantive justification of a state’s CMR must show
that it is necessary for the fulfilment of individuals’ rights in a meaningful way.
At this point we can identify two sets of weighty individual interests the mean-
ingful realisation of which requires the protection of a state’s CMR not to be
subverted. The first is, rather straightforwardly, the interests of individuals
whose rights are directly violated by the state when it fails to comply with its
moral duties; clearly their rights depend on, and ground, states’ capacity for
moral reasoning. The second is the rights of citizens who are not directly
wronged by their state. Here I would argue that, even if they are not the direct
victims of their state’s violations of its moral duties, citizens are wronged by
these violations, because, as members of their state they become complicit in its
wrongdoings. After all, states, and especially democratic states, pursue their
policies on behalf of, and in the name of their citizens. Furthermore, they use
their citizens’ resources in execute their policies, and are assisted by their
citizens’ compliance. As several authors have recently argued, it follows that
citizens bear a special moral connection to their state’s policies. When their state
commits a wrong, they share complicity for that wrong; they are justified in
feeling ashamed; and they incur special duties to make that wrong right. These
duties fall on citizens even if they, personally, did not support their state’s
wrongdoing. As members of a corporate agent who acted wrongly, they cannot
escape their connection to that wrong.71
71 See discussions in Margaret Gilbert, Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings, 6 J. ETHICS
 (2002). KUTZ, supra note 62. Avia Pasternak, Limiting States’ Corporate Responsibility, 21
J. POL. PHIL.  (2013).
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However, I would argue that as moral agents, citizens have a strong moral
interest in not being involved in wrongdoing. For being part of a corporate agent
that fails on its moral duties is a heavy moral burden – it connects us to a harm,
thus tainting us in a sense; it encumbers us with duties to the victims we would
not have had, had our group complied with its duties. If this observation is
correct, it follows that when some citizens and legislators fail in their duty not
take part in the moral subversion of their state, they are also wronging their
fellow-citizens, because they render them complicit in corporate wrongdoing.
To be clear, as the analysis above acknowledges, the state’s right not to be
subverted is a derivative right: as a CMA, the state has a corporate level interest
in being able to act on its moral duties, and it can demand its citizens to assist it
in discharging them. Substantively, this corporate interest is not important
enough to ground an original right. But it is important enough to generate a
derivative right, i. e. a right that protects the state itself – its own moral reason-
ing – but that is justified in light of the rights of individuals not to be subjected
to wrongful treatment, and not to be made complicit in wrongdoing.72
What would the state’s right not to be subverted imply in practice? In
answering this question, I focus on the citizens of a given state (although the
right not be subverted can create duties for additional agents, e. g. other states
in the world). If a state has a right not to be subverted then its citizens have the
duty, directed at their state, and in addition to their standard political obliga-
tions, not to engage in activities that would subvert its first moral power. I give
one example of what that duty might translate into. Consider the causal con-
nection between democracies’ level of compliance with basic human rights
requirements, and their participation in international human rights institutions.
I take it that a standard normative expectation of states, and in particular of
democratic states, is that they do not violate the basic human rights of their own
citizens and of non-citizens. However, it is often the case that democratic states
fail to live up to this expectation, for various epistemic and motivational rea-
sons, such as “fear, xenophobia, sectarianism, prejudice, indifference, and
political intrigue,” which are “powerful solvents of constitutional commit-
ments.”73 Some scholars argue that a reliable way to reduce the effect of such
subversive factors, and to increase democracies’ compliance with human rights
72 I have focused here on the state’s right not be subverted. But similar conclusions would
apply to other CMAs within the state. The government, for example, would also have that right,
as would be specific departments within the state.
73 Jamie Mayerfeld, A Madisonian Argument for Strengthening International Human Rights
Institutions: Lessons from Europe, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 214 (Luis
Cabrera ed., 2011).
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standards, is through membership in international human rights institutions
(such as, the European Court of Human Rights). Jamie Mayerfeld, for example,
suggests that membership in such institutions increases democracies’ ability to
engage in proper moral reasoning, inter alia because it provides them with
mutual support, and with the ability incorporate each other’s experiences.74 If
Mayerfeld’s empirical observations are correct, it follows that state leaders and
legislators have a prima facie duty to negotiate the inclusion of their state in
such institutions; and that their many citizens also have a prima facie duty to
vote for parties or legislators who would support this inclusion. So citizens who
cast a vote, whether in parliamentary elections or in a referendum, against the
inclusion of their state in international human rights institutions, violate (all else
being equal) that duty to their state not to subvert it.75 While these duties would
conceptually be owed to the state, because they would seek to protect its
normative decision making procedure, so that it acts on good moral reasons;
failing to act in this way is wrong because it undermines the rights of those who
would be harmed directly by the state and of fellow citizens. For example,
assume, as some argue, that the United State’s refusal to be included in major
international human rights institutions is a “major reason” for its involvement in
serious human rights violations, like torture.76 If this argument is correct, it
follows that American citizens and legislators have a duty to support their state’s
first moral power, by demanding that it is included in relevant international
human rights institutions. If they fail to do so, they harm those who suffer
human rights violations at their state’s hand; and they also harm their fellow
citizens, who become complicit in serious human rights violations.
Of course, one might challenge the observation that international human
rights institutions increase compliance with human rights. But whether or not
that empirical observation is correct, the point remains that given that the state
has the right not to be subverted, its citizens ought to consider the ways in
which its decision-making procedure is vulnerable to insidious internal and
external influences, and to support the implementation of mechanisms that
would enhance its capacity for moral reasoning.
74 Id. Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory
and Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT’L. REL. 157 (1995).
75 Citizens do not necessarily have an overall duty to vote for parties that are likely to endorse
the inclusion of their state in international human rights institutions. There will be other items
on the political agenda, which must be given proper consideration as well. But citizens should
take this normative consideration into account.
76 Jamie Mayerfeld, Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Law, 19 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 53 (2009).
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I now turn to examine two objections to the claim that the state has a
corporate right not to be subverted. The first objection concerns the potentially
oppressive implications of the claim that the state has a moral right, against its
citizens, that they respect its moral capacities. For example, a state with an anti-
abortion policy might evoke its right not to be subverted in order to justify a ban
on a pro-abortion political party, because that party might epistemically “sub-
vert” the state into reversing its anti-abortion agenda. Does my argument sanc-
tion such behaviour?
The answer to this question is negative. For my focus has been on state’s
moral rights and on citizens’ corresponding moral duties. That citizens have a
moral duty to vote in certain ways does not translate into the claim that they
have a legal duty to do so, or that the state may ban political parties in order to
prevent them from voting in certain ways. There are many other normative
considerations that play a role in determining democratic states’ legal right to
limit political participation, and while the state’s right against subversion
should play a role in that analysis, that role is by no means decisive. That
said, it is true that the state, and other citizens, could in principle argue that
voting for a pro-abortion party is morally problematic, given the subversive
potential of such a vote. However, note that all claims about the moral right
not to be subverted are based on a background theory of right and wrong. It is
only when A instigates B to perform something we think is wrong, that we can
accuse A of subverting B. In the example above, if abortion constitutes the
murder of innocent human beings, then voting for a party that supports abortion
may count as a potential subversion of the state’s moral capacities. But if
abortion is morally permissible, voting for a pro-abortion party is not subversive
in this way. Anti-abortion activists may argue that citizens who vote for a pro-
abortion party are subverting the state only if they can reasonably show that
abortion is wrong. If there is a disagreement about this question, then their
opponents could easily reject the subversion charge. Put differently, my claim
about the state’s moral right not to be subverted does not take a position about
the substantive moral theory that generates our moral expectations of the state.
It only identifies an additional reason why we ought to strive to ensure that our
state has the normative capacities to correctly identify its moral duties and to act
upon them: failing to do so constitutes a failure to respect our state’s moral
capacities.
The second objection concerns a more general worry about statements in
support of citizens’ duties towards their state as an entity that is separate to
them. One might argue that such claims run too close to fascist adorations of the
state. But this objection mischaracterises my argument: As I emphasised time
and again, the idea that states have CMRs is entirely compatible with moral
From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights 157
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/8/17 4:00 PM
individualism, and with the denial of the idea that states are valuable moral
agents in and of themselves. States’ CMRs are grounded in the functions they
play, as necessary institutions for the protection of individual rights. It gives
moral priority to individuals, and hence has nothing in common with fascist
perceptions of the state that grant it moral worth and even superiority.
Furthermore, I would argue that emphasizing the duties that citizens have
towards their state has an important rhetorical value. After all, many people
feel strong affiliation with their state, and with their role as members of their
state; they feel pride in its successes and shame in its moral failures. An
affirmation of the state’s right to demand of us that we respect its moral
personality, by ensuring that it can act in a morally responsible way in the
world, echoes these moral sentiments; it highlights the identity of the state as an
artificial creation of the people, that is set up in order to protect their rights and
to discharge their duties to each other and to other people in the world, but that
requires constant maintenance of its capacities to do so.
Conclusion
This paper sought to examine whether corporate moral agency entails CMRs. My
answer to this question draws on a functional account of CMRs, which grants
CMAs a limited, derivative moral standing. Key to this account is the distinction
between a conceptual and a substantive justification of corporate rights. While
substantively, CMRs are grounded in individual interests, it nevertheless
remains the case that conceptually, the right attaches to the group rather than
to its members.
Given the functional nature of the defence of corporate rights, the paper
does not give definitive positive answer to the question of which rights CMAs
have in the real world. This question, as it turns out, can only be answered on a
case-by-case basis. That said, I suggested that the very idea that some group
agents are morally responsible agents, with their own deliberative moral capa-
cities and the duty to act upon normative reasoning, leads to the conclusion that
they can have, and are very likely to have, rights that protect these deliberative
capacities. This suggestion points to an important connection between the idea
of corporate moral agency and specific CMRs.
As the final section of the paper suggested, the analysis has practical
implications with regard to real CMAs. One case I have focused on was that of
states and their right to be protected from moral subversion. But more generally,
the proposed framework has implications for other types of CMAs. Consider for
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example, recent rulings by the US Supreme Court, which expand the political
and civil rights of business corporations. As the analysis here suggests, one
reason to question such these decisions is that they are not sufficiently sensitive
to the distinction between conceptual and substantive justifications of CMRs.
The corporate moral agency thesis certainly gives us grounds to accept that,
conceptually, business corporations can have civil and political rights. But to
substantively grant such rights, we must show that they are necessary to protect
the rights of individual agents in the world. CMAs can have moral rights, but to
justify them, we must look above and beyond the corporate entity itself.
From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights 159
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/8/17 4:00 PM
